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THE USA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER A Debate Between Olavo de Carvalho and Aleksandr Dugin


2 Contents

The Structure of the Debate The Debaters


Olavo de Carvalho’s Answer Aleksandr Dugin’s Answer: Global Transition and Its Enemies


Aleksandr Dugin’s Reply: The West Against the Rest Olavo de Carvalho’s Reply


Aleksandr Dugin’s Response Olavo de Carvalho’s Response


Olavo de Carvalho’s Closing Remarks Aleksandr Dugin’s Closing Remarks: Against the Post-Modern World

Olavo de Carvalho’s answers and replies were translated from the Portuguese by Alessandro Cota.


The Debaters: Olavo de Carvalho and Aleksandr Dugin

On March 7, 2011, Olavo de Carvalho, President of the Inter-

American Institute for Philosophy, Government, and Social Thought, and Aleksandr Dugin, leader of the International Eurasian Movement, started a written debate on the topic “The USA and the New World Order.” The debate ended on May 9, 2011. Professor de Carvalho is a philosopher currently residing in the United States who has authored more than a dozen books and has been teaching an online philosophy course to more than 2,0 international students since 2008. His book Aristotle in a New Perspective (1996) has been acclaimed as a highly original contribution to the understanding of the Greek philosopher. Dugin is Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical strategist, leading organizer of the Eurasian Movement and considered the most influential Russian thinker of the post-Soviet era. His book, The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia (1997) has had a large influence on Russian military and foreign policy elites and has been adopted as a textbook in the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The Structure of the Debate

In the first segment, both participants respond to the following question: “What are the historical, political, ideological and economic factors and actors that now define the dynamics and configuration of power in the world, and what is the U.S. position in what is known as New World Order?”

In the second, Aleksandr Dugin replies to the answer Olavo de

Carvalho offered to the question posed by the organizers of the debate, and Olavo de Carvalho responds to Aleksandr Dugin’s reply. Next, in the third segment, Dugin examines and addresses de Carvalho’s response, and de Carvalho’s, in turn, examines and deals with Dugin’s examination.

Finally, the debate ends with each thinker offering his closing statements.


4 First Segment


Olavo de Carvalho’s Answer

Words change their meaning, weight and value according to the situations of speech. Upon entering this debate I must clarify from the outset that it is not a debate at all. The very idea of a debate presupposes both an opposite symmetry between the contending parties, from the point of view of their convictions, and some direct symmetry of their respective socioprofessional status: intellectuals discuss with intellectuals, politicians with politicians, professors with professors, preachers of religion with preachers of atheism, and so forth.

As for convictions, if we understand this term as only general statements about the structure of reality, mine do not differ from Professor Dugin’s in many essential points. Does he believe in God? So do I. Does he think a metaphysics of the absolute is possible? So do I. Does he wager that life has a meaning? So do I. Does he understand traditions, homeland, and family as the values that must be preserved above supposed economic and administrative conveniences? So do I. Does he see with horror the globalist project of the Rockfellers and Soros? So do I. It is not possible to organize a debate between two people who are in agreement.

On the other hand, from the standpoint of the actual positions we occupy in society, our differences are so numerous, so deep and so irreducible that the very proposal of putting us face to face has a certain comic incongruity to it. I am just a philosopher, writer, and professor, committed to the search of what seems to me to be the truth and to educating a group of people who are so kind as to pay attention to what I say. Neither these people nor I hold any public job. We do not have any influence on national or international politics. We do not even have the ambition—much less an explicit project—for changing the course of history, whatever it may be. Our only hope is to know reality to the utmost degree of our power and one day leave this life aware that we did not live in illusions and selfdelusion, that we did not let ourselves be misled and corrupted by the Prince of this World and by the promises of the ideologues, his servants. In the current power hierarchy of my native country, my opinion is worthless, except maybe as a negative example and an incarnation of absolute evil, which is a source of great satisfaction to me. In the country where I live, the government considers me at worst an inoffensive eccentric.

No political party, mass movement, government institution, church or religious sect considers me its mentor. So I can give my opinion as I wish, and change my opinion as many times as it seems right to me, with no

THE INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 2012 devastating practical consequences beyond the modest circle of my personal existence.

Now Professor Dugin, the son of a KGB officer and the political mentor of a man who is the very incarnation of the KGB, is the creator and guide of one of the widest and most ambitious geopolitical plans of all time—a plan adopted and followed as closely as possible by a nation which has the largest army in the world, the most efficient and daring secret service and a network of alliances that extends throughout four continents. To say that Professor Dugin is at the center and pinnacle of power is a simple matter of realism. To implement his plans, he has at his disposal Vladimir Putin’s strong arm, the armies of Russia and China and every terrorist organization of the Middle East, not to mention practically every leftist, fascist and neo- Nazi movement which today operate under the banner of his “Eurasian” project. As for myself, I not only lack a plan for my own retirement, but my only available war resources are my dog Big Mac and an old hunting shotgun.

This tremendous existential difference (fully illustrated by the pictures below) makes our opinions, even where their verbal expressions coincide to the letter, signify entirely different things in the framework of our respective goals. The answers to the questions that inspire this debate will show this, I hope, as clearly as do the photos.

There are two questions: who are the actors in the world scene and what is the position of the United States in it?

Mr. de Carvalho and his two dogs,

Big Mac and Missy. Mr. Aleksandr Dugin.


As for the first question: aside from Catholic and Protestant

Christianity, which I shall address later on, the historic forces that today contend for power in the world array themselves into three projects of global dominance, which I will tentatively call the “Russian-Chinese,” the “Western” (sometimes mistakenly called “Anglo-American”) and the “Islamic” projects.

Each of these has a well documented history, which shows their remote origins, the transformations they have gone through in the course of time and the present state of their implementation.

The agents that personify these projects today are as follows: 1. The ruling elite of Russia and China, and particularly the secret services of these two countries. 2. The Western financial elite, as represented particularly in the

Bilderberg Club, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission. 3. The Muslim Brotherhood, the religious leaders of several Islamic countries and the governments of some Muslim countries.

Of these three agents, only the first can be conceived of in strictly geopolitical terms, since its plans and actions correspond to well-defined national and regional interests. The second, which is more advanced in the implementation of its plans for world government, places itself explicitly above any national interests, including those of its countries of origin, which serve as its base of operations. In the third, conflicts of interests between national governments and the overarching goal of a Universal Caliphate are always ultimately resolved in favor of the latter, which, though currently existing only as an ideal, enjoys symbolic authority founded upon Koranic commandments that no Islamic government would dare to overtly challenge.

The conceptions of global power that these three agents strive to implement are very different from one another because they owe to heterogeneous and sometimes incompatible inspirations.

Therefore, they are not similar forces, or as it were, species of the same genus. They do not fight for the same goals and, when they occasionally resort to the same weapons (for example, economic warfare) they do so in different strategic contexts, where employing such weapons does not necessarily serve the same objectives.

Although nominally the relationships among them are competitive and antagonistic, sometimes even of a military nature, there are vast areas of fusion and collaboration, as flexible and changeable as they may be. This phenomenon disorients observers, producing all sorts of misguided and phantasmagorical interpretations, some in the form of “conspiracy theories,”

THE INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 2012 others as self-proclaimed “realistic” and “scientific” refutations of those theories.

A good deal of the nebulosity in the world scene is produced by a more or less constant fact, to wit: each of the three agents tends to construe in its own terms the plans and actions of the other two, partly for deliberate propaganda purposes, partly due to a genuine misunderstanding of the situation.

The strategic analyses by all involved each reflect the ideological bias that is proper to it. Even though they attempt to take into account the totality of available factors, the Russian-Chinese scheme stresses the geopolitical and military viewpoint, the Western scheme the economic, and the Islamic scheme the dispute among religions.

This difference reflects in turn the sociological composition of the ruling classes in the respective geographical areas: 1) Stemming as it does from the communist nomenklatura, the

Russian-Chinese ruling class is essentially made up of bureaucrats, intelligence service agents and military officers. 2) The preponderance of financiers and international bankers in the

Western establishment is too well known to require further discussion. 3) In the various countries of the Islamic complex, the authority of the ruler depends essentially on approval by the umma—the multitudinous community of authoritative interpreters of the traditional religion. Even though these countries show great variety in their domestic situations, it is not an exaggeration to describe the structure of their ruling power as “theocratic.”

Thus, for the first time in the history of the world, the three essential modalities of power—politico-military, economic and religious—find themselves personified in distinct supranational blocks, each of them with its own plans for world dominance and its peculiar mode of action. This does not mean that they do not act on all fronts, but only that their respective historical views and strategies are ultimately delimited by the modality of power they represent. It is not far-fetched to say that the world today is the object of a dispute among the military, bankers and preachers.

Even though in current debates these three blocks are almost invariably designated by the names of nations, States and governments, to depict their interactions as a dispute among nations or national interests is a residual habit of the old geopolitics that does not help us in any way to understand the present situation.

It is only in the Russian-Chinese case that the globalist project symmetrically corresponds to national interests, and that the principal agents

THE INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY, GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 2012 are the respective States and governments. This is so for the simple reason that the Communist regime, ruling there for decades, has dissolved or eliminated all other possible agents. The globalist elite of Russia and China is the government of these two countries.

By contrast, the Western globalist elite does not represent any national interest and does not identify with any particular State or government, though it controls several of them. On the contrary, when its interests collide with those of the nations where it originated (and this necessarily happens), it does not hesitate to turn against its own homeland, to subjugate it and, if necessary, to destroy it.

Islamic globalists serve, in principle, the general interests of all

Muslim States, united in the grand project of a Universal Caliphate. Divergences arising from clashes of national interests (as, for example, between Iran and Saudi Arabia) have not proved sufficient to cause incurable injuries to the unity of the long-term Islamic project. The Muslim Brotherhood, ring leader of the process, is a transnational organization, which governs some countries and in others is the political opposition party, but its influence is omnipresent in the Islamic world.

The heterogeneity and asymmetry of the three blocks is reflected in the image that they have of each other, as manifest in their propaganda speeches—a system of errors suggesting that the fate of the world is in the hands of delirious madmen: 1. The Russian-Chinese perspective (expanded today in the form of

Eurasianism, which will be one of the topics of this debate) describes the Western block as (a) a global expansion of American national power; (b) the materialized expression of the “open society” liberal ideology, such as eminently proposed by Sir Karl Popper; (c) the living incarnation of the Enlightenment’s materialist, scientistic and rationalist mentality, and therefore the enemy par excellence of all traditional spirituality. 2. Western globalism declares that it has no enemies other than “terrorism”—which it in no way identifies with the Islamic block, deeming it a residue of barbaric beliefs on the way to extinction—and “fundamentalism,” a notion that indistinctly blends the ideological spokesmen of Islamic terrorism and the “Christian right,” as if it the latter were an ally of the former and not one of its main victims. This way, fear of Islamic terrorism is used as a pretext to justify the official boycott of the Christian religion in Europe and in the United States! Russia and China are never presented as possible aggressors, but as allies of the West. In the worst case, China is portrayed as a trade competitor. In short: the ideology of Western globalism speaks as if it already personified an established

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